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INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0248
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 2575
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0466
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1572
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 3452
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 1362
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T OSLO 000002

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2020
TAGS: [ASEC](#) [NO](#) [OVIP](#) [PINR](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#)
SUBJECT: (S/NF) OSLO EAC REVIEWS TERRORISM ISSUES INCLUDING
VISAS VIPER

REF: A. 09 OSLO 712 (EAC MEETING)
[1](#)B. 09 OSLO 551 (EAC MEETING)
[1](#)C. TDS 314-070065-09
[1](#)D. 314-069652-09
[1](#)E. 314-059524-09
[1](#)F. 314-059229-09 AND PREVIOUS
[1](#)G. 09 STATE 132497

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James T. Heg for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
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[1](#)1. (S/NF) Following consultations with Ambassador White, Charge Heg convened an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting on January 5 to discuss measures in place at Embassy Oslo to avoid an incident like the attempted Christmas day bombing. The recent attack in Denmark, and developments regarding the al-Qaida affiliated cell in Oslo (see refs A-F), including inter alia available Norwegian counterterrorism resources, were also discussed. Participants included the Charge, A/DCM (PAO), RAO, RSO, POL/ECON, CONSUL, DATT, and ODC.

VISAS VIPER ISSUES

[1](#)2. (S/NF) The Consul began with a review of the new cable guidance from Washington (see ref G) that all new entries into Visas Viper cables must include data on the individual's visa history. The Consul noted that in the last twelve months, perhaps ten names had been submitted, eight of which were in one batch related to a cleric of Somali descent who had links to the Council of Islamic Courts in Somalia. The Charge asked what the steps would be taken if information came to the Country Team's attention that a person presented a security risk. The Consul replied that a Visas Viper submission cable would be drafted, and that cable would recommend revoking the subject's visa. The Consul recommended that RAO's until-now independent submissions of persons connected to terrorism should also be communicated to the consular section for citing in Visas Viper reporting. All EAC participants agreed that real-time, rolling input was key to the operation of the Visas Viper program. The Charge tasked the Consul, RAO, and RSO to submit a memorandum to the Ambassador covering how the Visas Viper program has worked and will work in future.

CHRISTMAS DAY BOMBING ISSUES

¶3. (S/NF) With regard specifically to the facts in the Christmas day bombing attempt, the Charge asked under what circumstances Embassy Oslo would revoke a visa. The Consul responded that, upon receipt of derogatory information, Post would seek a finding of ineligibility under 212(a)(3) from the Department, and then subsequently revoke the visa. Revocation would include: notice to the alien; notice to carriers; notice to the Department; and, if possible, physical cancellation of the visa foil. The Consul pointed out that one of the main problems in a country like Norway is that 90% of people travel to the United States visa-free, so denying U.S. entry privileges to terrorism-connected Norwegians, prior to travel, falls to ESTA processing. Accordingly, diligent use of Viper and other reporting channels is needed here.

AL-QAIDA CELL IN OSLO

¶4. (S/NF) With regard to the al-Qaida cell in Oslo (see refs A-F), the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) advises that the cell does not appear to be advancing any attack preparations at this time. In the aftermath of the POTUS visit, PST has reduced its physical surveillance of the plotters from 24/7 to the waking hours of the plotters. PST monitors them using only technical means during their sleeping hours. RAO said PST would like to arrest the plotters by February if they can get the legal evidence they need, as the investigation is a significant drain on PST's resources. In this connection, EAC agreed going forward to consider the adequacy of Norway's available resources devoted to counterterrorism activities.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE DANISH CARTOONIST ATTACK

¶5. (S/NF) The Charge asked whether the New Year's Day attack on Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard would increase Norway's sense of vulnerability to terrorism and lead perhaps to a reassessment of its counterterrorism capabilities. RAO said that the Norwegian PST still viewed Denmark as more of a target than Norway, for reasons very specific to the cartoon controversy. At the same time, the experience with the al-Qaida cell was likely to impact Norwegian attitudes, as this was a group of terrorists in their own midst. DATF pointed out the seemingly very low level of awareness of and resources to combat terrorism, when last year a French diplomat's car was set ablaze in front of his house in Oslo, and PST was not involved until a very late stage of the investigation.

HEG